Category Archives: Disaster Risk Management

When Help Can’t Come: What the 1995 Kobe Earthquake Still Teaches Us About Surviving Disaster

In 15 seconds, 6,434 people lost their lives — and the rescuers who saved the most were not professionals. They were neighbors.
6,434 lives lost in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake80%+ of deaths caused by building collapse and falling furniture1–2% of survivors rescued by professional emergency services

I was in Kyoto that morning

At around 6 a.m. on January 17, 1995, I was just waking up in Kyoto. I remember feeling a faint tremor. I thought it might be a dream. When I walked to the nearby station to check the trains, and then arrived at my office to find no one there, I turned on the television — and saw images I have never been able to forget: elevated expressways on their sides, rows of wooden homes pancaked flat, smoke rising across an entire district of Kobe.

I was working in tourism at the time. That morning changed the direction of my life. I went on to join the National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention in Japan, investigating disasters from Katrina to Ondoy to the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake. I now research disaster resilience at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. And across every disaster I have studied, one truth keeps surfacing: what happens in the first 15 minutes is determined by what people did — or did not do — in the weeks and months before.

Fifteen seconds. 6,434 lives.

At 5:46 a.m. on January 17, 1995, the Nojima Fault ruptured beneath the northern tip of Awaji Island, generating a Japan Meteorological Agency magnitude-7.3 earthquake. The strongest shaking lasted no more than 15 to 20 seconds. But in those seconds, the outcome for most victims was already decided. More than 80 percent of those who died were crushed or suffocated beneath collapsed buildings and toppled furniture — almost all in wooden structures built before Japan’s 1981 earthquake-resistant building code revision. The majority died almost instantly, before any rescue could have reached them. Over 100 fires broke out simultaneously. A 600-meter section of the elevated Hanshin Expressway toppled sideways. Water mains ruptured across the city, leaving fire crews with no water to fight the flames. More than 300,000 people poured into evacuation centers in mid-January cold.

“Kobe did not fail because rescuers were slow. It failed because, when an entire city is struck at once, professional rescue is physically impossible at scale. That was the lesson. It took the world by surprise.”

Who actually saved people?

A post-disaster survey conducted in one Kobe ward asked survivors rescued from collapsed buildings a single question: who helped you get out? The answer was striking. The overwhelming majority were freed by themselves, by family members, or by neighbors — by people who were physically present in the first minutes. Professional rescue services — fire departments, police, the Self-Defense Forces — accounted for only an estimated 1 to 2 percent of rescues in the acute phase.

This is not a criticism of those services. They responded. But roads were blocked, phones were down, and simultaneous structural collapses across an entire metropolitan area created a physical impossibility: no rescue organization, however skilled or well-resourced, can be everywhere at once when an entire city falls. The real rescuers that morning were the neighbors who grabbed bicycle frames and iron pipes to lever beams off pinned family members in the dark.

This single finding — 1 to 2 percent professional rescue — is widely credited as the moment Japan’s disaster policy pivoted permanently toward community-level preparedness. It gave rise to the framework now central to Japan’s DRR thinking: Jijo–Kyojo–Kōjo.

The survival ratio in a city-scale disaster (acute phase)

Self-help (Jijo)  — 70%Mutual (Kyojo)  20%Public 10%

This is not a rigid formula. It is a policy reminder: in the acute phase of a city-scale disaster, survival is predominantly a household and neighborhood question. Public help is essential — but it is slower and finite. Self-help is the foundation that lets you reach the moment when mutual-help and public-help can act.

The Tanaka family: a story rooted in real experience

In my research, I use case-based scenarios to make these dynamics visible. Consider a composite family — based on documented experiences in Kobe’s Nagata Ward — that I will call the Tanaka household. Hiroshi (42), a shoe-factory worker; his wife Keiko (39); their teenage daughter Aoi and young son Ren; and Hiroshi’s mother Sumiko (71), who has limited mobility from arthritis and takes daily blood-pressure medication. They live in a two-story wooden row house built decades before the 1981 code.

When the quake hit, the second floor partially collapsed onto the first. Hiroshi and Keiko were pinned by a fallen wardrobe. Aoi was trapped under a collapsed beam. Sumiko could not move. It took nearly an hour — with neighbors using a bicycle and a length of pipe — to free Sumiko as fire spread through the block. They evacuated barefoot, in nightclothes, in near-freezing air. Sumiko’s medication bottle was buried in the rubble. So were the bank books, the property deed, and the insurance papers.

Every difficulty this family faced was foreseeable. Almost all of it was preventable. That is the defining lesson of Kobe.

What you can do — starting tonight

As a researcher who has walked through disaster zones from New Orleans to the Philippines to Japan’s Tohoku coast, I am often asked what the single most important thing a household can do is. The honest answer is that it is not one thing — but all of the following are straightforward, low-cost, and evidence-backed.

1. Anchor all tall furniture in your bedroom

The number-one killer in Kobe was not the earthquake itself, but falling wardrobes and bookshelves onto sleeping people. An L-bracket costs less than lunch.

2. Place shoes and a flashlight beside your bed

Glass-covered floors in the dark are a serious injury risk after any structural event. Do this tonight before you sleep.

3. Build a 3-to-7-day stockpile of water and food

3 liters of water per person per day, plus food requiring no cooking. In Kobe, water mains in some areas were not fully restored for months.

4. Keep essential medications grab-ready

At least one week of any chronic-disease prescription, children’s inhalers, or blood pressure drugs — in a sealed pouch outside the collapse zone. For Sumiko, this was a near-fatal omission.

5. Digitize your key documents

Photograph your ID, property deed, insurance policies, and bank documents. Store copies in the cloud and with a relative in another city. Lost documents delay every form of recovery assistance.

6. Agree on two meeting points

One just outside the building, one nearby landmark. Assign who is responsible for each vulnerable member. Do not rely on mobile phones — lines fail in disasters.

7. Run a household drill twice a year

A kit you have never practiced with, with expired medication and no agreed plan, is a false comfort. The preparation is the practice.

Mutual-help: the neighbor you know is the neighbor who digs you out

Self-help has limits. Sumiko survived because neighbors came. In modern cities, it is not uncommon to not know the person living next door. But my field research across Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines confirms the same finding repeatedly: communities that recover fastest — and lose the fewest lives in the acute phase — are communities where people already knew each other before the disaster.

You do not need a formal community organization to start. A brief greeting in the elevator. Passing along a neighborhood bulletin with a few words added. Attending one local meeting. These small acts create familiarity — and familiarity, in a disaster, means you are someone a neighbor will think to check on. That is not sentimentality. It is disaster science.

In the months after the 1995 earthquake, over one million volunteers descended on Kobe from across Japan. That outpouring is remembered as the birth of modern volunteer culture in Japan. It was remarkable. But the real mutual-help happened in the first hour — in the hands of people already there, already awake, already digging.

Disasters are social, not just natural

I want to close with something that three decades of research have made impossible for me to ignore. The scale of deaths in Kobe was not determined by the earthquake alone. It was determined by which buildings people were sleeping in, and which neighborhoods they lived in. Homes built before 1981 — concentrated in older, lower-income districts — collapsed at far higher rates than newer structures. The same magnitude of shaking killed far fewer people in neighborhoods with newer construction.

This is the core argument of disaster research as I practice it: the disaster begins before the disaster. Vulnerability — to poverty, to age, to disability, to housing precarity — shapes who is at risk long before any fault line moves. Individual preparedness matters enormously. But so does the society we build together. Ensuring that the most vulnerable households have access to retrofitting subsidies, medication coverage, and document support is not charity. It is evidence-based risk reduction.

At 5:46 a.m. on January 17, 1995, I was in Kyoto and barely noticed the tremor. Most people in Kobe had no warning at all. The question that has driven my research ever since is simple: what, in the days and weeks before that morning, could have changed what happened in those 15 seconds?

The answer — every time — is: quite a lot.

Key takeaway

The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake proved that when a city is struck all at once, professional rescue is overwhelmed within minutes — and the vast majority of survivors are saved by themselves, their families, and their neighbors. Real resilience is built before disaster strikes: anchor your furniture, stockpile for at least three days, protect medications and documents, agree on how to reunite, and practice. Self-help and mutual-help are not substitutes for public assistance — they are what keep you alive until it arrives.

Sources & further reading

Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake documentation: Cabinet Office, Japan (https://www.bousai.go.jp/kyoiku/kyokun/hanshin_awaji/)

Disaster Research Notes (Nakasu): disasterresearchnotes.site (https://disasterresearchnotes.site)

Sendai Framework for DRR (2015–2030): UNDRR (https://www.undrr.org/publication/sendai-framework-disaster-risk-reduction-2015-2030)

Note:

This is my personal experience and knowledge. Disaster preparedness depends entirely on your situation. Please use this article for your reference.

Why Your Culture May Determine Whether You Survive a Disaster

When disaster strikes, we tend to focus on the storm, the flood, or the earthquake itself. But after two decades of fieldwork across Southeast Asia and Japan, I keep coming back to something less visible — and just as powerful: the culture, institutions, and social structures of the communities involved shape survival just as much as the disaster itself.

It’s Not Just About the Disaster

Sociologist Benjamin F. McLuckie compared disaster responses across Japan, Italy, and the United States as far back as the 1970s. His key finding: how centralized a government is — how much decision-making power sits with national versus local authorities — significantly shapes what actually happens on the ground when emergencies unfold.

But culture alone does not explain everything. What really drives outcomes is a three-way mix of culture, institutions, and technology. A community that values collective action still needs neighborhood associations, shelters, and early warning systems to turn that value into real protection. Without those structures, values remain just values.

What I Found in the Field

My work on the 2011 Thailand floods — which disrupted global supply chains and devastated communities around industrial parks — brought this home clearly. Social cohesion and local governance structures were just as predictive of recovery as physical flood barriers. Through the Japan-Thailand SATREPS collaboration, my colleagues and I developed community capacity assessments and social vulnerability indices to help local leaders act before the next disaster, not scramble after it.

What struck me most was this: communities with strong internal networks recovered faster, not because they had more resources, but because they already knew how to work together.

The New Orleans Lesson

After Hurricane Katrina in 2005, researchers noticed that Vietnamese-American communities in New Orleans recovered more quickly than many others. The easy explanation was “culture.” But the real answer was more grounded: strong churches functioning as organizing hubs, dense social networks built through shared migration experience, and established community leadership capable of coordinating a return. Culture mattered — but it worked through concrete institutions. That distinction is important.

Why This Matters Now

Climate change is making disasters more frequent and more severe. Yet many governments still treat disaster response as a purely technical problem — better seawalls, faster alert systems. Those matters. But they miss the human layer that makes those tools actually work.

When we recognize that community trust, family networks, and local governance are all part of the disaster equation, we can design better evacuation plans, more effective early warnings, and recovery programs that genuinely reach the people who need them most.

Every disaster holds up a mirror to the society it strikes. What we see reflected — who gets help quickly, who rebuilds together, who gets left behind — is shaped by culture, institutions, and history working in combination. That is not just a scholarly observation. It is, ultimately, a matter of life and death.

Sources:

McLuckie, B.F. (1977). Italy, Japan, and the United States: Effects of Centralization on Disaster Responses. University of Delaware;

Nakasu, T. et al. (2022). International Journal of Disaster Resilience and Built Environment. https://doi.org/10.1108/IJDRBE-10-2020-0107;

Nakasu, T. (2023). Environmental Development and Sustainability. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10668-023-04305-7

【The 2011 Chao Phraya River Floods Case Study Content: Nikkei BizRuptors (website)】

Balancing Continuity and Survival: Lessons for Overseas Manufacturers from Thailand’s 2001 Flood

【Updated : Disaster Links Library launched (website)】

Disaster Link Library

【Project launched (website)】Disaster Risk Management in Aging Societies: Bridging Japanese Experience with Thai Policy Needs

Disaster Risk Management in Aging Societies

【Disaster Research: Infograph】AI-Integrated Disaster Preparedness Platforms (Open Access Examples)

The infographic of the AI-Integrated Disaster Preparedness Platforms is shown as an infographic: AI-Integrated Disaster Preparedness Platforms

【Disaster Research: Infograph】1985 mexico city earthquake

The infographic of the 1985 Mexico City Earthquake, mainly focusing on the social factors with earthquake characteristics, is shown as an infographic: http://disasters.weblike.jp/mexico%20infogr.html

The distance impact reminded me of the situation in Bangkok when an earthquake occurred in Myanmar in April 2025.

【Disaster Research: Infograph】The 2004 Tsunami in Thailand

This infographic was presented at RIHN in Japan as part of the Prof. Ito project, as part of the Feasibility Study. The infographic website is: https://disasters.weblike.jp/IOT%20v2.html

The presented numbers should be confirmed. Especially, the foreigner’s death toll and the Thai national death toll, with their proportion, are under reinvestigation.

【Disaster Research:Infograph】Myanmar’s Education Sector Impact & Recovery

An infographic, “Myanmar Earthquake 2025 Educational Sector Impact & Recovery Roadmap,” was created. Myanmar Earthquake 2025 Educational Sector Impact & Recovery Roadmap

*Please note that these are my research results, for my memo.