Category Archives: Evacuation

When Help Can’t Come: What the 1995 Kobe Earthquake Still Teaches Us About Surviving Disaster

In 15 seconds, 6,434 people lost their lives — and the rescuers who saved the most were not professionals. They were neighbors.

6,434 lives lost in the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake

80%+ of deaths caused by building collapse and falling furniture

1–2% of survivors rescued by professional emergency services

I was in Kyoto that morning

At around 6 a.m. on January 17, 1995, I was just waking up in Kyoto. I remember feeling a faint tremor. I thought it might be a dream. When I walked to the nearby station to check the trains, and then arrived at my office to find no one there, I turned on the television — and saw images I have never been able to forget: elevated expressways on their sides, rows of wooden homes pancaked flat, smoke rising across an entire district of Kobe.

I was working in tourism at the time. That morning changed the direction of my life. I went on to join the National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention in Japan, investigating disasters from Katrina to Ondoy to the 2011 Great East Japan Earthquake. I now research disaster resilience at Chulalongkorn University in Bangkok. And across every disaster I have studied, one truth keeps surfacing: what happens in the first 15 minutes is determined by what people did — or did not do — in the weeks and months before.

Fifteen seconds. 6,434 lives.

At 5:46 a.m. on January 17, 1995, the Nojima Fault ruptured beneath the northern tip of Awaji Island, generating a Japan Meteorological Agency magnitude-7.3 earthquake. The strongest shaking lasted no more than 15 to 20 seconds. But in those seconds, the outcome for most victims was already decided. More than 80 percent of those who died were crushed or suffocated beneath collapsed buildings and toppled furniture — almost all in wooden structures built before Japan’s 1981 earthquake-resistant building code revision. The majority died almost instantly, before any rescue could have reached them. Over 100 fires broke out simultaneously. A 600-meter section of the elevated Hanshin Expressway toppled sideways. Water mains ruptured across the city, leaving fire crews with no water to fight the flames. More than 300,000 people poured into evacuation centers in mid-January cold.

“Kobe did not fail because rescuers were slow. It failed because, when an entire city is struck at once, professional rescue is physically impossible at scale. That was the lesson. It took the world by surprise.”

Who actually saved people?

A post-disaster survey conducted in one Kobe ward asked survivors rescued from collapsed buildings a single question: who helped you get out? The answer was striking. The overwhelming majority were freed by themselves, by family members, or by neighbors — by people who were physically present in the first minutes. Professional rescue services — fire departments, police, the Self-Defense Forces — accounted for only an estimated 1 to 2 percent of rescues in the acute phase.

This is not a criticism of those services. They responded. But roads were blocked, phones were down, and simultaneous structural collapses across an entire metropolitan area created a physical impossibility: no rescue organization, however skilled or well-resourced, can be everywhere at once when an entire city falls. The real rescuers that morning were the neighbors who grabbed bicycle frames and iron pipes to lever beams off pinned family members in the dark.

This single finding — 1 to 2 percent professional rescue — is widely credited as the moment Japan’s disaster policy pivoted permanently toward community-level preparedness. It gave rise to the framework now central to Japan’s DRR thinking: Jijo–Kyojo–Kōjo.

The survival ratio in a city-scale disaster (acute phase)

Self-help (Jijo) — 70%

Mutual (Kyojo) 20%

Public 10%

This is not a rigid formula. It is a policy reminder: in the acute phase of a city-scale disaster, survival is predominantly a household and neighborhood question. Public help is essential — but it is slower and finite. Self-help is the foundation that lets you reach the moment when mutual-help and public-help can act.

The Tanaka family: a story rooted in real experience

In my research, I use case-based scenarios to make these dynamics visible. Consider a composite family — based on documented experiences in Kobe’s Nagata Ward — that I will call the Tanaka household. Hiroshi (42), a shoe-factory worker; his wife Keiko (39); their teenage daughter Aoi and young son Ren; and Hiroshi’s mother Sumiko (71), who has limited mobility from arthritis and takes daily blood-pressure medication. They live in a two-story wooden row house built decades before the 1981 code.

When the quake hit, the second floor partially collapsed onto the first. Hiroshi and Keiko were pinned by a fallen wardrobe. Aoi was trapped under a collapsed beam. Sumiko could not move. It took nearly an hour — with neighbors using a bicycle and a length of pipe — to free Sumiko as fire spread through the block. They evacuated barefoot, in nightclothes, in near-freezing air. Sumiko’s medication bottle was buried in the rubble. So were the bank books, the property deed, and the insurance papers.

Every difficulty this family faced was foreseeable. Almost all of it was preventable. That is the defining lesson of Kobe.

What you can do — starting tonight

As a researcher who has walked through disaster zones from New Orleans to the Philippines to Japan’s Tohoku coast, I am often asked what the single most important thing a household can do is. The honest answer is that it is not one thing — but all of the following are straightforward, low-cost, and evidence-backed.

1. Anchor all tall furniture in your bedroom

The number-one killer in Kobe was not the earthquake itself, but falling wardrobes and bookshelves onto sleeping people. An L-bracket costs less than lunch.

2. Place shoes and a flashlight beside your bed

Glass-covered floors in the dark are a serious injury risk after any structural event. Do this tonight before you sleep.

3. Build a 3-to-7-day stockpile of water and food

3 liters of water per person per day, plus food requiring no cooking. In Kobe, water mains in some areas were not fully restored for months.

4. Keep essential medications grab-ready

At least one week of any chronic-disease prescription, children’s inhalers, or blood pressure drugs — in a sealed pouch outside the collapse zone. For Sumiko, this was a near-fatal omission.

5. Digitize your key documents

Photograph your ID, property deed, insurance policies, and bank documents. Store copies in the cloud and with a relative in another city. Lost documents delay every form of recovery assistance.

6. Agree on two meeting points

One just outside the building, one nearby landmark. Assign who is responsible for each vulnerable member. Do not rely on mobile phones — lines fail in disasters.

7. Run a household drill twice a year

A kit you have never practiced with, with expired medication and no agreed plan, is a false comfort. The preparation is the practice.

Mutual-help: the neighbor you know is the neighbor who digs you out

Self-help has limits. Sumiko survived because neighbors came. In modern cities, it is not uncommon to not know the person living next door. But my field research across Japan, Thailand, and the Philippines confirms the same finding repeatedly: communities that recover fastest — and lose the fewest lives in the acute phase — are communities where people already knew each other before the disaster.

You do not need a formal community organization to start. A brief greeting in the elevator. Passing along a neighborhood bulletin with a few words added. Attending one local meeting. These small acts create familiarity — and familiarity, in a disaster, means you are someone a neighbor will think to check on. That is not sentimentality. It is disaster science.

In the months after the 1995 earthquake, over one million volunteers descended on Kobe from across Japan. That outpouring is remembered as the birth of modern volunteer culture in Japan. It was remarkable. But the real mutual-help happened in the first hour — in the hands of people already there, already awake, already digging.

Disasters are social, not just natural

I want to close with something that three decades of research have made impossible for me to ignore. The scale of deaths in Kobe was not determined by the earthquake alone. It was determined by which buildings people were sleeping in, and which neighborhoods they lived in. Homes built before 1981 — concentrated in older, lower-income districts — collapsed at far higher rates than newer structures. The same magnitude of shaking killed far fewer people in neighborhoods with newer construction.

This is the core argument of disaster research as I practice it: the disaster begins before the disaster. Vulnerability — to poverty, to age, to disability, to housing precarity — shapes who is at risk long before any fault line moves. Individual preparedness matters enormously. But so does the society we build together. Ensuring that the most vulnerable households have access to retrofitting subsidies, medication coverage, and document support is not charity. It is evidence-based risk reduction.

At 5:46 a.m. on January 17, 1995, I was in Kyoto and barely noticed the tremor. Most people in Kobe had no warning at all. The question that has driven my research ever since is simple: what, in the days and weeks before that morning, could have changed what happened in those 15 seconds?

The answer — every time — is: quite a lot.

Key takeaway

The Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake proved that when a city is struck all at once, professional rescue is overwhelmed within minutes — and the vast majority of survivors are saved by themselves, their families, and their neighbors. Real resilience is built before disaster strikes: anchor your furniture, stockpile for at least three days, protect medications and documents, agree on how to reunite, and practice. Self-help and mutual-help are not substitutes for public assistance — they are what keep you alive until it arrives.

Sources & further reading

Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake documentation: Cabinet Office, Japan (https://www.bousai.go.jp/kyoiku/kyokun/hanshin_awaji/)

Disaster Research Notes (Nakasu): disasterresearchnotes.site (https://disasterresearchnotes.site)

Sendai Framework for DRR (2015–2030): UNDRR (https://www.undrr.org/publication/sendai-framework-disaster-risk-reduction-2015-2030)

Note：

This is my personal experience and knowledge. Disaster preparedness depends entirely on your situation. Please use this article for your reference.

【The 2011 Chao Phraya River Floods Case Study Content: Nikkei BizRuptors (website)】

Balancing Continuity and Survival: Lessons for Overseas Manufacturers from Thailand’s 2001 Flood

【Updated : Disaster Links Library launched (website)】

Disaster Link Library

【Disaster Research】When Nature Meets Human Error: Lessons from History’s Deadliest Volcanic Mudflow 40 Years Ago

Growing up, many of us were taught that natural disasters are inevitable acts of nature beyond human control. This perspective changed dramatically for me when I started working at a research institute. My senior researcher emphatically told me, “The natural disaster is not natural.” This profound statement transformed my approach to disaster research, helping me understand that human decisions often determine whether natural hazards become catastrophic disasters.

The Forgotten Tragedy of Armero

On November 13, 1985, the Nevado del Ruiz volcano in Colombia erupted after 69 years of dormancy. The eruption triggered massive mudflows (lahars) that rushed down the volcano’s slopes, burying the town of Armero and claiming over 23,000 lives. This catastrophe stands as Colombia’s worst natural hazard-induced disaster and the deadliest lahar ever recorded.

What makes this tragedy particularly heartbreaking is its preventability. Scientists had observed warning signs for months, with seismic activity beginning as early as November 1984. By March 1985, a UN seismologist had observed a 150-meter vapor column erupting from the mountain and concluded that a major eruption was likely.

Despite these warnings, effective action to protect the vulnerable population never materialized. The devastation of Armero wasn’t simply the result of volcanic activity but the culmination of multiple human failures in risk communication, historical memory, and emergency response.

When Warning Systems Fail: Communication Breakdown

The Armero disaster epitomizes what disaster researchers call “cascading failures” in warning systems. Scientists had created hazard maps showing the potential danger to Armero in October 1985, just weeks before the eruption. However, these maps suffered from critical design flaws that rendered them ineffective.

One version lacked a clear legend to interpret the colored zones, making it incomprehensible to the general public. Devastatingly, Armero was placed within a green zone on some maps, which many residents misinterpreted as indicating safety rather than danger. According to reports, many survivors later recounted they had never even heard of the hazard maps before the eruption, despite their publication in several major newspapers.

As a disaster researcher, I’ve seen this pattern repeatedly: scientific knowledge fails to translate into public understanding and action. When I conducted fieldwork in flood-prone regions in Thailand, I discovered a similar disconnect between technical risk assessments and public perception. Effective disaster mitigation requires not just accurate information but information that is accessible and actionable for those at risk.

The Cultural Blindspots of Risk Perception

The tragedy of Armero illustrates how cultural and historical factors shape how communities perceive risk. Despite previous eruptions destroying the town in 1595 and 1845, causing approximately 636 and 1,000 deaths respectively, collective memory of these disasters had seemingly faded as the town was rebuilt in the same location.

In the hours before the disaster, when ash began falling around 3:00 PM, local leaders, including the town priest, reportedly advised people to “stay calm” and remain indoors. Some residents recall a priest encouraging them to “enjoy this beautiful show” of ashfall, suggesting it was harmless. These reassurances from trusted community figures likely discouraged self-evacuation that might have saved lives.

My research in disaster-prone communities has consistently shown that risk perception is heavily influenced by cultural factors, including trust in authority figures and historical experience with hazards. In Japan, for instance, the tsunami markers that indicate historic high-water levels serve as constant physical reminders of past disasters, helping to maintain community awareness across generations.

Systemic Failures and Institutional Response

The Armero tragedy wasn’t just a failure of risk communication or cultural blind spots—it revealed systemic weaknesses in disaster governance. Colombia was grappling with significant political instability due to years of civil war, potentially diverting governmental resources from disaster preparedness. Just a week before the eruption, the government was heavily focused on a guerrilla siege at the Palace of Justice in Bogotá.

Reports suggest there was reluctance on the part of the government to bear the potential economic and political repercussions of ordering an evacuation that might have proven unnecessary. This hesitation proved fatal when communication systems failed on the night of the eruption due to a severe storm, preventing warnings from reaching residents even after the lahars were already descending toward the town.

In my research examining large-scale flood disasters, I’ve found that effective disaster governance requires robust institutions that prioritize public safety over short-term economic or political considerations. My 2021 comparative analysis of major flood events demonstrated that preemptive protective actions consistently save more lives than reactive emergency responses, even when accounting for false alarms.

Learning from Tragedy: The Path Forward

The Armero disaster, while devastating, catalyzed significant advancements in volcano monitoring and disaster risk reduction globally. Colombia established specialized disaster management agencies with greater emphasis on proactive preparedness. The

Colombian Geological Service expanded from limited capacity to a network of 600 stations monitoring 23 active volcanoes.

The contrast with the 1991 eruption of Mount Pinatubo in the Philippines demonstrates the impact of these lessons. There, timely forecasts and effective evacuation procedures saved thousands of lives. The memory of Armero remains a powerful reminder of the consequences of inadequate disaster preparedness.

As I’ve emphasized in my own research on disaster resilience in industrial complex areas, building sustainable communities requires integrating technical knowledge with social systems. My work developing social vulnerability indices demonstrates that effective disaster risk reduction must address both physical hazards and social vulnerabilities.

Remember, disasters may be triggered by natural events, but their impact is determined by human decisions. By learning from tragedies like Armero, we can create more resilient communities prepared to face future challenges.

Day_64 : 1985 Nevado del Ruiz Volcano Eruption

One of the most significant volcanic disasters we must know about is the 1985 Nevado del Ruiz volcano eruption. Approx.23000 citizens in Armero city were dead. The cultural aspects were embedded in this disaster. The disaster was predicted. The hazard maps indicate that the city will be affected by a volcanic eruption and lahars. Both priest and mayor told the citizens to stay in the same place because they were afraid of panic before the time, but did not tell them to evacuate. That made tragedy. The people in the city tended to follow both persons because of the culture, which is a religious and vertically structured society. There were also other factors*.

*https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Nevado_del_Ruiz#Eruption_and_lahars

Day_207 : Lessons from Hurricane Katrina: A Retrospective Analysis and Future Implications for Disaster Risk Reduction

The picture was taken in Mississippi on December 3, 2005.

Nearly two decades have passed since Hurricane Katrina devastated the Gulf Coast, particularly New Orleans, in 2005. As we reflect on this catastrophic event, it’s crucial to reassess our understanding of the disaster, its impacts, and the lessons learned for future disaster risk reduction efforts. This updated analysis incorporates new research, recent case studies, and current best practices in disaster management to provide a comprehensive view of Hurricane Katrina’s long-lasting effects and implications for disaster preparedness.

Revisiting the Data: The Importance of Pre-Disaster Information

One of the most valuable resources for understanding the pre-Katrina landscape was the Greater New Orleans Community Data Center (GNOCDC) website. This data repository provided detailed demographic and socioeconomic information at the parish and ward levels, offering crucial insights into the social fabric of affected areas.

Key Findings from Pre-Katrina Data

Vehicle Ownership: Data from GNOCDC revealed significant disparities in vehicle ownership across New Orleans neighborhoods. For instance, the Lower 9th Ward, one of the most severely affected areas, had a low rate of vehicle ownership. This factor critically impaired residents’ ability to evacuate independently, necessitating government assistance for evacuation.
Socioeconomic Disparities: Analysis of household incomes, education levels, and employment rates across different wards highlighted pre-existing vulnerabilities that exacerbated the disaster’s impact.
Housing Quality: Information on housing stock age and quality provided insights into structural vulnerabilities that contributed to the extent of physical damage.

The Victimization Process: A Multi-Stage Analysis

Understanding the disaster’s impact requires examining multiple stages of the event and its aftermath. Building on the original five-stage model (Pre-disaster, Direct Damage, Social Disorder, Life Environment, and Reconstruction and Recovery), recent research has emphasized the interconnectedness of these stages and their long-term implications.

Updated Insights on Disaster Stages

Pre-disaster Stage:
- New research highlights the critical role of community-based preparedness programs in enhancing resilience.
- Studies show that areas with strong social networks and community engagement had better evacuation rates and post-disaster recovery.
Direct Damage Stage:
- Advanced modeling techniques have improved our understanding of infrastructure vulnerabilities, particularly in flood-prone areas.
- Recent case studies from hurricanes like Harvey (2017) and Ida (2021) provide comparative data on immediate impact patterns.
Social Disorder Stage:
- Long-term studies have revealed the persistent psychological impacts of displacement and community disruption.
- New frameworks for maintaining social order during disasters emphasize the importance of clear communication and community leadership.
Life Environment Stage:
- Research on environmental health impacts has expanded, including studies on mold exposure and water contamination.
- The concept of “build back better” has gained traction, influencing reconstruction efforts to enhance resilience.
Reconstruction and Recovery Stage:
- Long-term studies show uneven recovery patterns, with some neighborhoods thriving while others continue to struggle.
- The role of federal, state, and local policies in shaping recovery outcomes has been extensively analyzed, offering lessons for future disaster recovery planning.

Emerging Trends in Disaster Risk Reduction

Since Hurricane Katrina, several key trends have emerged in the field of Disaster Risk Reduction:

Climate Change Adaptation: There’s an increased focus on integrating climate change projections into disaster preparedness and urban planning.
Community-Based Disaster Risk Management: Emphasizing local knowledge and community participation in disaster planning and response.
Technological Advancements: Utilization of GIS, remote sensing, and AI for improved risk assessment and early warning systems.
Social Vulnerability Mapping: More sophisticated tools for identifying and addressing vulnerabilities based on socioeconomic factors.
Nature-Based Solutions: Growing emphasis on using natural ecosystems to mitigate disaster risks, such as wetland restoration for flood control.

Actionable Recommendations

Based on lessons learned from Katrina and subsequent disasters, here are key recommendations for enhancing disaster resilience:

Invest in Inclusive Preparedness: Ensure evacuation plans and resources are accessible to all community members, especially those with limited mobility or resources.
Strengthen Infrastructure Resilience: Implement stricter building codes and invest in critical infrastructure upgrades, particularly in vulnerable areas.
Enhance Early Warning Systems: Develop multi-channel, culturally appropriate warning systems that reach all segments of the population.
Foster Community Cohesion: Support programs that build social capital and community networks, which are crucial for both evacuation and recovery.
Integrate Social Vulnerability in Planning: Use social vulnerability indices to inform resource allocation and targeted support in disaster planning and response.
Promote Sustainable Recovery: Implement recovery strategies that not only rebuild but also address pre-existing social and environmental issues.
Continuous Learning and Adaptation: Establish mechanisms for ongoing assessment and incorporation of lessons learned from each disaster event.

The tragedy of Hurricane Katrina continues to offer valuable lessons for disaster risk reduction. By combining data-driven analysis with a nuanced understanding of social and environmental factors, we can work towards creating more resilient communities. As we face increasing challenges from climate change and urban growth, the insights gained from studying Katrina’s impact remain crucial for shaping effective disaster management strategies worldwide.

Hurricane Katrina Disaster Research conducted by NIED（in Japanese）

A comparative analysis of large-scale flood disasters

Day_157: Disaster Warning (1)

I will update a column of the NIED e-mail magazine I wrote long ago because the content does not fade with time. (I will do this step by step in Japanese and English.) I will also add comments to update the situation.

Sorry, I am now revising this post because of the translation difficulties. This post will be revised again. Thank you.

Published May 6, 2010
NIED-DIL e-mail magazine: Disaster Warning (1)

■ Disaster Warning (1) ■

In February 2008, a survey provided an opportunity to visit Hawaii’s Pacific Tsunami Warning Center (PTWC). In a study, I interviewed the director of the PTWC, and the first thing that caught my attention was the role of the media. The director told me that a public tsunami evacuation alert was required three hours before the event, which was too time-sensitive, but the press was an advantage to do this. However, there were various restrictions for the government organization, such as warnings in an international framework. I remembered the Chilean Navy’s disaster response to the damage caused by the earthquake and tsunami in Chile in February this year.

Next, I was interested in science, technology, and data, which are the basis of alarm decisions. I think regular (flood, etc.) warnings will be judged based on current and past data, but especially for tsunami warnings, there were errors in the original earthquake and the tide gauge data. To judge, we should know that 99.99 percent of the errors could be caused by error. The fact that past data is not very useful because the devices to figure out the data are changing daily, making it difficult to rely on it.

From these facts, it was generally noticed that the disaster warning was based on the combination of the progress of science and technology and the competence of the person in charge. The actual warning also relies on the institution belonging to it. For example, variables such as the recipient of the alert, the psychology of the local people, the social situation, and various systems also needed to be added.

Issued May 6, 2010 No. 4

Day_198 : Characteristics of Earthquake Disasters

In most cases, when a strong earthquake occurs, many people die as buildings collapse. For example, in the Kobe earthquake, more than 90% of the 5,000 people who died lost their lives within 15 minutes immediately after the quake. For this reason, it is essential to build buildings well to reduce the number of people who die in earthquakes. This will prevent fires, make it less likely that people will lose their homes and become permanent refugees, and reduce the problems of relief and rebuilding.

In developing countries, especially in arid and semi-arid regions, earthquakes cause many deaths. In such areas, sun-dried bricks called “adobe” are common building materials, and buildings made of these bricks often collapse easily in earthquakes, burying many people alive. In developing countries, for economic reasons, standards for building earthquake-resistant buildings are usually low, and construction is often inadequate. Therefore, even earthquakes that are not strong can easily cause severe damage. In addition, in regions with many wooden houses, such as Central America and Southeast Asia, buildings can collapse and catch fire.

Day_166: Interview Report: Hurricane Katrina Response (3)

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Date and time
7 May 2006

Visit
New Orleans Homeland Security and Public Safety Office
(New Orleans City Office of Homeland Security and Public Safety )

Interviewee
Colonel and Director

Subject
Hurricane Katrina Disaster Response
>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

https://disasterresearchnotes.site/archives/3002

There are three drainage canals in New Orleans. There is also a pump station for each. Since New Orleans is below sea level, water is constantly pumped from these pump stations and drained into Lake Pontchartrain.

The breakwater was corrupted by the storm surge. The water was flowing into the canal from the lake, and at the same time, the pump station had the maximum pressure with the water. The pumps were broken and became not-functioned.

After the hurricane, there was only one evacuation route that crossed the bridge over Mississippi. However, the route had been blocked. These also affected support activities.

<Measures for breakwater>
At present, the Corps of Engineers will set a lock at the entrance of the canal and close them to prevent water from flowing into the canal since this year.

The challenge from this year is the evacuation of West Bank citizens. Because the levees are weak, hurricanes can easily break them.

The levee can be effective this year, but the problem is that in the next two years, the pump station will have insufficient capacity to pump water.

< Future measures of the city >
The following three goals are set as future measures. First, leave no one in the shelter. Second, the city will assist those who have no access to evacuation. Third, improve the safety of city facilities and property before and after the disaster.

Another important point this year is to let all citizens evacuate two days before Hurricane hit. The challenge is the reality that many people would not try to evacuate. As a background, the levee is to be broken, needs to have a terrible situation imagination.

There is a plan to install floodgates in a wide range of wetlands in eastern New Orleans to prevent storm surges.

Political challenge, New Orleans, including the peripheral has originally 100 million people, was an energy supply base, there is a tremendous national influence, the people here have to work.

As a countermeasure, the city has provided a wireless system. The system had been unavailable after the Hurricane.

A radio station in City Hall as a countermeasure against rumors which had become a social issue during Katrina was set up to keep media members staying and unifying the correct information.

Related information

The NIED team went to New Orleans and Missippi coastal areas to investigate.
Characteristics of the 2005 Hurricane Katrina Disasters

The community data center is the best to investigate to grasp the trend by using stats.

https://disasterresearchnotes.site/archives/2975

Day_161: Interview Report: Hurricane Katrina Response (2)

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>
Date and time
7 May 2006
Visit
New Orleans Homeland Security and Public Safety Office
(New Orleans City Office of Homeland Security and Public Safety )

Interviewee
Colonel and Director

Subject
Hurricane Katrina Disaster Response

>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>>

https://disasterresearchnotes.site/archives/4059

<Contents>

The following situations were going on to make a decision; one is for the residents who have no means to evacuate and do not have the supply transportation means from the city. The other is for the people who have the means to evacuate but do not do that.

Under these circumstances, a federal rescue bus arrived six days later.

The city has been flooded for two days since the water entered New Orleans. Specifically, the city hall had no water shortly after passing the hurricane, but two days later, it was almost breast-high water level inundation.

Picture: New Orleans City Hall (7 May 2006)

<Current Social Situation>

New Orleans was the only city in the United States to lose its school system, the justice system, home, and tax system. This week, the first trial has been held since last August.

In terms of the school system, only 4 out of 140 schools are open.

The water supply system has lost 80 %.

There is a nuclear power plant near New Orleans. Entergy Corporation is the operating company. However, the company was bankrupted. There are only 10 out of 400 staff members at present.

The natural gas pipeline has been damaged, making gas supply impossible. There are these energy supply problems.

As mentioned, the Entergy Corporation, which is supplying the gas, has been bankrupted, the Entergy Corporation has no support measures from the government.

<New Orleans Society and Geographical Background>

Hurricane Katrina is a human-made disaster. Concerning the background, levees were built in the early 1800s and have worked to prevent annual floods. However, the wetlands had been overlooked. In this area, they dug up the route, so this may cause the storm surge, and also oil drilling reduces the wetlands, weakened resistance to hurricanes.

Katrina disaster is also a national issue. The background of southeastern Louisiana, 40 % of the country’s oil is supplied from here. At the same time, 60 percent natural gas supply of the country is from here. Also, it has 135 chemical and petroleum refineries along the Mississippi River. These are unlikely to create a similar zone in the United States, where environmental pollution becomes a social problem. The Port of New Orleans (New Orleans harbor) can have the giant scale oil tanker in the port. Moreover, the New Orleans area is also a freight rail hub.

To be continued…