Day_172 : Hollywood Movie “The Beach” and The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami in Thailand

Past writings are to be disclosed little by little with some changes.

Nikkan Berita
Nikkan Berita Writer’s Archive December 30, 2006

The Supreme Court of Thailand ordered 20th Century Fox Inc. and its local subsidiaries to restore the ecosystem of Phi Phi Island, acknowledging that the company degraded the environment around Phi Phi Lei Island for the filming of the Hollywood movie “The Beach” in 2000 on December 7, 2006. The film, starring Leonardo DiCaprio, has made great strides in the development of tourism on the island and displaced many tourists, but the island was one of the worst affected areas by the Indian Ocean Tsunami of late 2004, and many tourists lost their lives.

Flyer: The Movie “Tha Beach”

Tourism development for economic development and environmental issues lay largely in the background of why Koh Phi Phi was one of the hardest-hit areas by the tsunami in Thailand.

It all started with the baht crisis that hit the Thai economy in 1997. In the early 1990s, the Thai government established the Ministry of Science, Technology and Environment and the Environmental Fund, enacted a number of environmental laws and enacted a national environmental boom, which began in the early 1990s. A prime example is a controversy over the alteration of the environment for Hollywood movies, known as “the beach controversy,” which began in 1998.

This was sparked by an attempt by a film crew to alter the landscape of Maya Beach on the island of Phi Phi Ley. For the filming of football game scenes, the sandy beach was widened by bulldozers and non-indigenous coco palm trees were imported and planted on the beach to create an image of a tropical paradise. The Royal Forest Department’s decision to approve the alteration was a measure that went so far as to bend the law in order to attract international investment with the aim of reviving the Thai economy.

This has led to the neglect of nature conservation, and local NGOs and others have begun to investigate and prosecute the environmental degradation around the island.

The tsunami that struck Phi Phi Island on December 26, 2004, occurred in the midst of such tourism development.

Now, two years after the tsunami, the island of Phi Phi Lei and the surrounding areas have regained their natural beauty, having been cleared of the man-made nature created by the tsunami.

Mr. Songboon of TOT Krabi Province, a major telecommunications company in Thailand, said, “I’ve been watching Phi Phi Island for a long time, but the sea was the dirtiest just before the tsunami. He said with great emotion, “The beaches around the area after the tsunami have regained the beauty of 10 years ago. He is currently staying on Phi Phi don Island to set up an internet connection.

Picture: Maya Beach

Mr. Spar, who runs a dive shop in the hard-hit Thongsai Bay, said, “For a while after the tsunami, we were in a vicious circle, with fewer customers and higher rates for the limited accommodations available to stay, and even fewer customers. However, now the sea itself is getting very clean and the city has recovered a lot, and the customers have returned. Management is getting a little better, too. and a glimpse of hope.

Picture: Thongsai Bay

Supreme Court decision that seems too little too late. It will be interesting to see how Phi Phi Island rebuilds and learn from the experience of the tsunami and its recovery process.

Natural Disasters and Disaster Management in Thailand
Natural Disasters and Disaster Management in Thailand

Day_171 : Past Interview Records – PTWC (Pacific Tsunami Warning Center) in Hawaii (2)

Interview Records at PTWC No.2
2008.2.26 (Tue.) at 1000 am

The records from the interview survey are shown below.

■ Science and technology
Many models of the tsunami have been developed. However, it is difficult to adopt because it is crucial whether it is practical or not.

■ Staff training
Only internal training is available.

■ A system where Civil Defense gives warnings to citizens.
There is a hotline to the provincial government and another one to the federal government.

■ Work shift
One person is always at the center for 24 hours.
8hr-4hr-4hr 4hr 16hrs are in shift
When there is a problem, three staff gather at the center.

■ Backup
The center’s backup is at the Alaska center and if Hawaii doesn’t work. Alaska center can cover.

■ Relationship with media
Concerning the media, media is, in a sense, a partner.
Civil Defense needs 3 hours before the event to evacuate. for that reason, there are too many time constraints. The media is fast. However, there are various restrictions. To decide to proceed with the warning or not, the media has no such authority. Also, in the United States, the media is a business and not state-owned, so it could mislead. You must always pay attention to the points.

■ Resources
Before the tsunami damage of 2004, the conditions were very limited in resources. A lot of money was invested in this field since the events of the year. The function of the center has been improved because of that. The staff has increased. The 2004 event was a severe tsunami disaster by letting the world know the reality.

Related Info. and Books
The following tsunami warning center provides the world situations on the map and list
U.S, Tsunami Warning CentersU.S, Tsunami Warning Centers

Day_170 : The methodology of the Research on the communities and workers sustainability in the industrial complex area affected by the 2011 Chao Phraya Flood  

Basically, we proceed with a top-down process for the research. The followings are the outlines of the procedures for the surveys: 1) Rojana Industrial Park and Japanese companies and their responsible persons 2) Communities: Community leaders, employees, and critical facilities and their responsible persons.

1) Rojana Industrial Park and Japanese companies and their responsible persons
The followings are the reasons why Japanese companies and why Rojana Industrial Park in the central region of Thailand are selected for the project. The first, 451 of 804 inundated companies in the central region of Thailand caused by the 2011 flood were Japanese related (Tokyo Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co.,Ltd., 2011). The second, the Rojana Industrial Park, is one of the seven inundated industrial parks in the central region of Thailand. Rojana Industrial Park is also deeply related to the Japanese company because Rojana Industrial Park was established as a joint venture between Japanese (Nippon Steel & Sumikin Bussan Corporation) and Thai (Vinichbutr’s Group) companies in 1983. The Japanese target companies are mainly selected through the connections with the Japanese Chamber of Commerce Bangkok and Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO). The responsible persons are chosen totally up to the companies. The representative Japanese and Thai managers and persons in charge of BCP or risk management of the companies are chosen to meet our needs. We conduct focus group interviews and questionnaire surveys for the above persons and employees in the companies. Questionnaires are distributed and collected in the box in the canteen of the companies.

2) Communities: Community leaders, employees, and critical facilities and their responsible persons
A top-down approach in data collection is applied by gaining the necessary authorization from the senior-level officials such as Chief of DDPM Ayutthaya and Chief district office, which subsequently facilitated reaching out to Tambon and Mooban leaders through the District office. This approach proved useful in establishing the proper and assured contacts to conduct the surveys in the target area.

Firstly, we ask permission to do surveys from the Ayutthaya governor and the chief of the DDPM Ayutthaya office. The second, we are introduced to meet the target Amphoe Uthai chief and ask him to communicate with the four target Tambon leaders. The third, we asl Tambon leaders to introduce the thirty-five Muban leaders and also the persons in critical facilities in the area. After the process, we conduct the employees’ surveys. The target persons, 400, are randomly selected with the recognitions of the Muban leaders based on the Yamane formula. We also proceed with the interview surveys to our prioritized twenty-five critical facilities acknowledged by the Tambon and Muban leaders. The representatives or the persons in charge of risk management in the critical facilities are required to answer the questions.

Day_169: The 2011 Chao Phraya River Flood Literature Reviews

Regarding the published literature, there are several approaches to investigate the 2011 flood.
Mark and Lebel (Mark and Lebel, 2016) describe how Thailand’s incomplete decentralization and administrative fragmentation has created numerous barriers to polycentric disaster governance.

Hagiwara et al. (2014) explained the chain reactions of the economic damage mainly derived from the experience of Japanese enterprises and points out issues that disrupted their businesses. That paper focused on the risk management changes of the firms after the 2011 flood, indicating they have strengthened their flood countermeasures as a whole, but points to the need to consider more about the collaborations with business partners or other entities.

Okazumi and Nakasu (2013) (2015) examined the devastating exacerbation of economic damage through a social background perspective and enterprise inter-relationships.

Nakasu (2017) clarified the reasons why so many Japanese companies moved to the potential risk area in Thailand. The reasons are from the perspective of both the country’s social factors through decentralization policies facilitated by the Thai government and also yen appreciation triggered by the Plaza agreement (1985) and the Lehman Brother’s bankruptcy (2008) to propel Japanese enterprise relocation and advancement.

Haraguch and L. Upmanu (2015) emphasized the decision-making process of enterprises to clarify the trigger of economic damage. That paper proposed measures for related supply chain risk through setting research questions such as private investment decision-making, the diversified sources of procurement, emergent assistance from other partner companies in the same supply chain, and the degree of the recovery of customers.

Tamada et al. (2013) approached the subject mainly from economic, political, hydrological, and technological perspectives with various authors. That book clarified the complexity of the 2011 flood and overviewed how human interventions affect the disaster, such as local people’s lifestyle changes before the disaster, the establishment of the industrial complexes in the area, government agency conflicts, dam operation impacts, unexpected rainfall, and private company reactions.

Singkran (2017) reviewed the 2011 flood from disaster management views and emphasized the need for more non-structural countermeasures and participatory collaboration among stakeholders for effective disaster management.

Hagiwara, Y, Kuribayashi, D, Okazumi, T, Nakasu, T. (2014). Characteristics of the Chain-Reaction Damage of the Japanese Firms Affected by the 2011 Thai Flood, Advances in River Engineering Vol.20, pp.397 – 402(in Japanese)

Haraguchi, M and Upmanu, L. (2015). Flood risks and impacts: A Case Study of Thailand’s Floods in 2011 and Research Questions for Supply Chain Decision Making, International Journal of Disaster Risk  Reduction, 14:256-272.

Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok. (2012). 2011 Economic Overview of Thailand(2011/2012). Japanese Chamber of Commerce, Bangkok.

Japan Science and Technology Agency (JST). (2019). Regional Resilience Enhancement through Establishment of Area-BCM at Industry Complexes in Thailand: Enhance regional resilience through visualization of disaster risks with industry, government and academia collaboration. SATREPS (Science and Technology Research Partnership for Sustainable Development) Project accessed March 20, 2019

JETRO. (2012). Special Topics: Information on Thai Flood Disaster Recovery, Tokyo (in Japanese). accessed June 20, 2012.

Marks D and Lebel L. (2016). Disaster governance and the scalar politics of incomplete decentralization: fragmented and contested responses to the 2011 floods in Central Thailand. Habitat Int Decentralizing Disaster Gov Spec Issue 52:57–66.

Marks, D. (2019). Assembling the 2011 Thailand floods: Protecting farmers and inundating high-value industrial estates in a fragmented hydro-social territory. Political Geography, 68, 66-76.

Nakasu, T, Okazumi, T. and Shimizu, Y. (2013). Establishment of Industrial Areas and New Risk Management: Chain Reactions of Economic Damage caused by 2011 Thailand Chao Phraya River Flood Disasters and Local Societies. The Journal of Urban Social Studies,No.5, 2013, 159-169.

Nakasu, T. (2017). Natural Disasters and Disaster Management in Thailand: Status, Risks, and Trends.13th International Conference on Thai Studies.

Office of the National Economic and Social Development Boad (NESDB). (2016). The National Economic and Social Development Plan.Retrieved May 4, 2017.

Okazumi, T. and Nakasu, T. (2015). Lessons learned from two unprecedented disasters in 2011–Great East Japan Earthquake and Tsunami in Japan and Chao Phraya River flood in Thailand. International journal of disaster risk reduction, 13, 200-206.

Singkran, N. (2017). Flood risk management in Thailand: Shifting from a passive to a progressive paradigm. International journal of disaster risk reduction, 25, 92-100.

Sukekawa, S.(2013). Impacts on Industries and Enterprises Caused by the Thai 2011 Great Flood. In Thai 2011 Great Flood. Chiba: IDE-JETRO. (in Japanese)

Tamada, Y.Hoshikawa, K. Funatsu, T. ed. (2013). The 2011 Great Flood: Records and Lessons. In Thai 2011 Great Flood. Chiba: IDE-JETRO(in Japanese).

Tokyo Marine & Nichido Fire Insurance Co.,Ltd.(2011). Lessons Learned from the 2011 Thailand Flood Disaster: Points of flood risk countermeasures in overseas bases.

Day_168 : Past Interview Records – PTWC (Pacific Tsunami Warning Center) in Hawaii (1)

Continue to the past New Orleans Interview Records, I would like to open the memo about the interview to PTWC. It was a great time and I learned a lot from the interviews.  So I would like to share the fact to let you know their works to tackle the tsunami disasters in the world.

PTWC is the core center for the tsunami warning well known to the world.

2008.2.26 (Tue.) at 1000 am
15 staff, director, deputy director
Information Technician, including nine scientists
16-hour shift on 8-4-4, homes are next to the center

The records from the interview survey are shown below.

■ Evacuation
There is no international standard in terminology. Terminology varies by country/region. The words sometimes make me confused. Also, in the past, it was two either evacuation nor no evacuation.

■ Warning Error
It is challenging to give a warning. There are errors in the original earthquake and the tide data. There is an error in the gauge also.
To judge them collect is too hard. So, it can be said that 99.99% is an error.

In Hawaii, only a quarter of evacuation was actually damaged in the past. It is not unusual that although there were evacuations, there were no damages at all.

■ Past data and warning judgment
Only use a few. Because how to put out the past data, equipment, etc.are hard to do. Which way is the numerical model used to determine if the earthquake becomes a tsunami is complicated. There are more things to do.

■ Relationship with other countries
The countries that are most focused on warning about tsunami in the Pacific are Japan, America, Australia, Chile, Canada, and Russia. Also, it is not possible to evaluate the inspection records of other countries. This should be noted.

■ At the time of the 2004 tsunami
Most of the records before the Indian Ocean Tsunami were reported hourly, so judge the event was tough. Every 15 minutes, now every 6 minutes is normal and very good.

■ Conditions for cancellation
Make a comprehensive decision. The problem of reflections adds to the complexity. Not only direct waves but also an indirect wave should be considered.

Related Books and info.

Day_83 : Tsunami – the words

Tsunami is the words coming from Japan

Day_167: Imagine from Disaster Damage Statistics

NIED-DIL mail magazine: 6
Imagine from disaster damage statistics
Contribution day and time: 2013/08/19

There is an index called the World Risk Index. The world risk report ranks Bangladesh as one of the high-risk countries in the world in 2019.

Indonesia and Haiti were easy to imagine, linked to the damages caused by recent earthquakes. Previously, there was an opportunity to learn from a land environment perspective about the past major disasters that struck Bangladesh, especially the large-scale cyclone disasters in 1970 and 1991. During a study session at the institution, I leaned the reported number of the casualties caused by the disasters was 500,000 and 140,000 people each. I was surprised to see the large numbers, but I was wondering why these numbers are so rough. When I looked at the table showing the breakdown numbers, I felt, “Oh!”

Building damage, human suffering, and livestock damage are listed. For example, the cyclone disaster in 1991 resulted in 1,630,543 house damage, 140,000 human suffering (dead or missing), and 584,471 livestock damage.

Yes, human suffering seemed to be a rough figure, while house damage and livestock damage were written down to one digit. And when we looked at what kind of country Bangladesh was like such as caste, religion, and livestock.

The background of the numbers, such as meaning, etc., has come into view. Regarding the number of dead and missing people in 1970, there are no accurate figures, and reports from 200,000 to 550,000 people have been reported in various fields.

Day_117 : Bangladesh-Disasters, Lands, and Statistics (2)

When there is a disaster, numbers about the damage come out, but I thought it was a very important viewpoint to think about where the numbers came out and what you can imagine from those numbers.

By the way, the web site is
Issued July 5, 2010 No. 6

Related Books and Info. for Further Understanding

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Day_166: Interview Report: Hurricane Katrina Response (3)

Date and time
7 May 2006

New Orleans Homeland Security and Public Safety Office
(New Orleans City Office of Homeland Security and Public Safety )

Colonel and Director

Hurricane Katrina Disaster Response

Day_103 : New Orleans and Hurricane Katrina in 2005

There are three drainage canals in New Orleans. There is also a pump station for each. Since New Orleans is below sea level, water is constantly pumped from these pump stations and drained into Lake Pontchartrain.

The breakwater was corrupted by the storm surge. The water was flowing into the canal from the lake, and at the same time, the pump station had the maximum pressure with the water. The pumps were broken and became not-functioned.

After the hurricane, there was only one evacuation route that crossed the bridge over Mississippi. However, the route had been blocked. These also affected support activities.

<Measures for breakwater>
At present, the Corps of Engineers will set a lock at the entrance of the canal and close them to prevent water from flowing into the canal since this year.

The challenge from this year is the evacuation of West Bank citizens. Because the levees are weak, hurricanes can easily break them.

The levee can be effective this year, but the problem is that in the next two years, the pump station will have insufficient capacity to pump water.

< Future measures of the city >
The following three goals are set as future measures. First, leave no one in the shelter. Second, the city will assist those who have no access to evacuation. Third, improve the safety of city facilities and property before and after the disaster.

Another important point this year is to let all citizens evacuate two days before Hurricane hit. The challenge is the reality that many people would not try to evacuate. As a background, the levee is to be broken, needs to have a terrible situation imagination.

There is a plan to install floodgates in a wide range of wetlands in eastern New Orleans to prevent storm surges.

Political challenge, New Orleans, including the peripheral has originally 100 million people, was an energy supply base, there is a tremendous national influence, the people here have to work.

As a countermeasure, the city has provided a wireless system. The system had been unavailable after the Hurricane.

A radio station in City Hall as a countermeasure against rumors which had become a social issue during Katrina was set up to keep media members staying and unifying the correct information.

Related information

The NIED team went to New Orleans and Missippi coastal areas to investigate.
Characteristics of the 2005 Hurricane Katrina Disasters

The community data center is the best to investigate to grasp the trend by using stats.

Day_100 : A Human Suffering Exacerbation-Data from Greater New Orleans Community Data Center

Day_165: Capacity, Coping Capacity, and Capacity Assessment

Based on the UNDRR, the capacity, coping capacity, and capacity assessment are defined as follows:

Capacity is “the combination of all the strengths, attributes and resources available within an organization, community or society to manage and reduce disaster risks and strengthen resilience.” and also annotated “capacity may include infrastructure, institutions, human knowledge and skills, and collective attributes such as social relationships, leadership and management”

Coping capacity is “the ability of people, organizations and systems, using available skills and resources, to manage adverse conditions, risk or disasters. The capacity to cope requires continuing awareness, resources and good management, both in normal times as well as during disasters or adverse conditions. Coping capacities contribute to the reduction of disaster risks.”

Capacity assessment is “the process by which the capacity of a group, organization or society is reviewed against desired goals, where existing capacities are identified for maintenance or strengthening and capacity gaps are identified for further action.”

We consider the capacity as a part of the vulnerability mentioned in the Press and Release (PAR) model. The capacity is examined as a coping capacity in the context of the disaster.

This means capacity is more changing, human-centered, government-related, and timely measurement aspects compared to the other vulnerability factors.

As mentioned above, the capacity is considered one of the vulnerability factors and the vulnerability index can be analyzed based on the statistical data. However, the applicable capacity statistical data is difficult to determine and also difficult to obtain in Thailand. In addition, capacity cannot be measured well by the statistical data. They could be much influenced by social networks, past experience, and other factors. With this situation, the capacity assessment can be utilized not only itself but also to apply to measure a social vulnerability as well as visualize the risk by overlapping with hazard risk on the GIS. Also, the capacity can be considered to be the key to examine resilience.

Day_163: PAR model : Hazard and Vulnerability (3)

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